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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2008, at the peak of the financial crisis, Oren Bar-
Gill and Elizabeth Warren published a law review article proposing
the creation of a new federal agency charged with protecting
consumers from dangerous lending practices.' Fewer than two years
later, in response to the most serious challenge to the United States
financial system since the Great Depression,2 Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank").3 Adopting the idea of Bar-Gill and Warren, Dodd-
Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"
or "Bureau"), whose mission is to ensure "that markets for consumer
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive." Its architects have argued that if the CFPB had been in
place in the mid-2000s, it could have prevented the recent financial
crisis.'
* C 2011 Jared Elosta.
1. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 6 (2008). Professor Warren first proposed the idea of a consumer financial protection
agency in a 2007 article where she argued for this agency using a memorable analogy:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into
flames and burning down your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing
home with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family
out on the street-and the mortgage won't even carry a disclosure of that fact to
the homeowner.
Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate: If It's Good Enough for Microwaves, It's Good
Enough for Mortgages, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8, 8.
2. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2 (2009).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
2011)). President Obama signed the bill into law on July 21, 2010. See Brady Dennis,
Obama Ushersin NewinancialEra, WASH. POST, July 22,2010, at A 13.
4. § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979-80 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511); see also Learn
About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance
.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) ("The central mission of the ... Bureau is to
make markets for consumer financial products and services work for Americans-whether
they are applying for a mortgage, choosing among credit cards, or using any number of
other consumer financial products.").
5. See Interview by Tess Vigeland with Barney Frank, Chairman, House Comm. on
Fin. Servs. (June 25, 2010), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display
/web/2010/06/25/mm-rep-barney-frank-on-financial-reform. Professor Warren has said that
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In their 2008 article, Bar-Gill and Warren argued that a new
consumer financial protection agency was needed because, among
other reasons, existing federal financial regulators were insufficiently
motivated to focus on consumer protection.6 Bar-Gill and Warren
also alleged that the aggressive preemption of state consumer
financial protection laws by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC")' in the 2000s weakened consumer financial
protection at the state level.8 Throughout the past decade, consumer
advocates, attorneys general, and academics have agreed, criticizing
the OCC and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")9 for their use
of preemption to prevent states from cracking down on predatory
lending. 0 For their part, the OCC and other federal regulators have
defended their use of preemption, arguing that the U.S. Constitution
requires preemption where state law conflicts with federal law, and
that preemption is an important tool for promoting the efficient
operation of credit markets." As developed more fully below, both
sides of the debate make a compelling argument, creating a
preemption dilemma: preemption of state consumer financial
protection laws could both harm and benefit consumers.
if the agency existed ten years ago, "the subprime mortgages that were sold to families
across the country and that ultimately cost so many of them their homes would never have
been marketed. Without those subprime mortgages fed into the system, the housing
bubble would not have inflated with such speed." Jim Puzzanghera, Q&A: Elizabeth
Warren, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2010, at Bl.
6. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 90.
7. The OCC is a federal agency within the Treasury Department that regulates
national banks in order to maintain their safety and soundness and ensure that all
Americans have "fair and equal access to financial services." About the OCC, OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/index-
about.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
8. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 92-93.
9. The OTS is another agency housed within the Treasury Department, and it is
charged with regulating federally chartered thrifts (savings associations and savings banks)
in order to "maintain their safety and soundness, and compliance with consumer
protection laws and regulations." OTS Profile, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=OTSProfile (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). Dodd-Frank
eliminated the OTS and placed its authority with the OCC and the Federal Reserve.
§ 312(b), 124 Stat. at 1521-22 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5412).
10. See Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us: The Watchdogs Who Saw the
Subprime Disaster Coming, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 20,2008, at 36,41.
11. See John D. Hawke, Jr., Former Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Statement Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n (Apr. 8,
2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-testimony/2010-0408-
Hawke.pdf; Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the N.Y. Bankers Ass'n (July 14, 2005),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2005/pub-speech-2005-
68.pdf.
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This Recent Development examines how Dodd-Frank changes
the relationship between state and federal consumer financial
protection authority and helps resolve the preemption dilemma. It
argues that Dodd-Frank promotes "dynamic federalism," an
arrangement of governance whereby overlapping authority and
competition between state and federal regulators in the area of
consumer financial protection has the potential to make the
preemption dilemma much less problematic.12 By creating a powerful
new agency in the CFPB while simultaneously weakening the ability
of federal regulators to preempt state consumer protection laws,
Dodd-Frank creates a new framework for state and federal consumer
protection authorities. This innovation in consumer financial
protection should satisfy both those arguing for greater state powers
to protect their citizens and those emphasizing the need for
consistent, nationwide regulations in order to promote efficient credit
markets.
Part I examines the recent history of preemption before Dodd-
Frank, and it explains how, over the past decade, federal regulators
have had broad power to preempt state consumer financial protection
laws. Part II highlights how both sides of the preemption debate have
well-founded positions and that admitting this creates a preemption
dilemma for policymakers. Part III suggests that the creation of the
CFPB by Dodd-Frank is one key component that will reorient the
preemption dilemma. Part IV argues that Dodd-Frank further
resolves this dilemma by weakening federal preemption while
empowering state regulators, thereby promoting dynamic federalism.
I. PREEMPTION BEFORE DODD-FRANK
The doctrine of preemption stems from the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, which makes federal law "the supreme Law of
the Land."13 Because of the Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps, or
preempts, state law when there is a conflict between the two.14 In the
12. The concept of dynamic federalism has been applied in the context of
environmental and securities regulation. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the
Benefits ofDynamic Federalism m Environmental Law 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 170-73 (2006)
(providing several examples of dynamic federalism in environmental regulation); Renee
M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Compedion, Cooperation and Securities Enforcemen 4 11
CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 121-26 (2005) (describing the salutary effects of recent competition
between state and federal regulators of securities).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
14. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 330 (1819). Apart from state consumer
financial laws, the subject of this Recent Development, the Supreme Court has recently
been very active in holding that a wide variety of state laws have been preempted,
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field of banking law, preemption is primarily based on the National
Bank Act of 1864 ("NBA"), which created national banks and
thereby created the country's unique dual system of state-chartered
and nationally-chartered banks." The NBA gives national banks "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business
of banking."16
In Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA. v. Nelson," the
Supreme Court stated its standard for preemption of state law under
the NBA.1 Barnett Bank involved the question of whether a federal
law allowing (but not requiring) national banks to sell insurance
preempted a Florida law that prohibited national banks from selling
insurance in towns populated by fewer than 5,000 people.19 In
declaring that the Florida law in this case was preempted, the Court
noted that the central question in deciding whether a federal law
preempts a state law is whether Congress intended the federal law to
have that effect.20 Only if Congress intended the federal law to
preempt the state law will the Supremacy Clause require
preemption. 21 The Court then observed that there are three methods
for determining Congress's intent and thus three kinds of preemption.
First, there is express preemption: if the explicit language of a federal
statute conflicts with state law, then the state law is preempted.'
Second, where this kind of express preemption is not available, the
including environmental laws, products liability laws, tobacco advertising laws, and laws
regulating international trade. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It
Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2004).
While the Court has claimed that it starts with a presumption against preemption out of
respect for the sovereignty of the states, some scholars have viewed the frequency with
which the Court has found preemption of state laws that regulate business as undermining
this claimed allegiance to federalism and as exposing political biases on the Court. See id.
at 1314-15. This inconsistency has also been noted regarding members of Congress who
view themselves as federalists while eagerly supporting the preemption of state laws
regulating business. SeeJones, supra note 12, at 114.
15. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-
30, 192-213 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the history of the dual system of national banking in
America and the powers of national banks in the context of preemption); Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 1, at 79-83 (discussing the increasing scope of federal preemption in
the realm of banking law over the past several decades).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006).
17. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
18. Seeid. at 33.
19. Id. at 27-29.
20. Id. at 30.
21. Id.
22. Seeid. at 31.
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Court may apply field preemption, where it decides that the effect of
a federal law is so pervasive that it leaves no room for the operation
of a certain category of state laws.' Finally, the Court stated that it
will infer Congress's intent that a federal law preempts a state law if
there is an "irreconcilable conflict" between the two.24 These three
tests for whether preemption applies have been part of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence for decades. 25 In what was the most relevant
holding from BarnettBank for purposes of this Recent Development,
the Court held that when the NBA or another federal law relating to
the powers of national banks does not explicitly preempt a state law,
the Court would apply the third kind of preemption-conflict
preemption-instead of field preemption.26 It then interpreted a
conflict between a state law and a federal banking law to exist where
the state law would "prevent or significantly interfere with the
national bank's exercise of its powers" as determined by federal law.27
If such a conflict exists, the state law must be preempted. The Court
in Barnett Bank found that although the Florida law denying national
banks the power to sell insurance did not directly contradict the
federal statute, it did serve as an obstacle to a power that Congress
intended to confer on national banks. 28
The standard of preemption in banking law established in
BarnettBank became a major source of contention in the early 2000s.
23. See id. Field preemption involves the carving out of a group of state laws that fall
under a certain category, such as lending laws. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
OCC's Preempdon Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to
the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protecdon, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
225, 233-37 (2004) (arguing that the OCC's 2004 preemption regulation constituted de
facto field preemption of state laws that regulated the lending powers of national banks).
As discussed further in this Part, before Dodd-Frank, the OTS had claimed field
preemption of state laws affecting the lending powers of federal savings associations. See
12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010).
24. SeeBarnettBank, 517 U.S. at 31.
25. SeeChemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1317 n.13.
26. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 ("In this case we must ask whether or not the Federal
and State Statutes are in 'irreconcilable conflict.'" (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)). In Gade v Nadonal Solid Wastes ManagementAss'n, the Court
usefully elaborated on conflict preemption, explaining that
[a]bsent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of
implied pre-emption: field preemption ... and conflict preemption, where
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or
where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
27. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33.
28. Id. at 31.
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During that period the OCC took a tough stance toward state
antipredatory lending laws, leading to increasing acrimony between
the OCC and the states. 9 The most visible example of the growing
conflict between states and the 0CC was the 0 CC's 2003 preemption
of the Georgia Fair Lending Act ("GFLA").30 The GFLA was
modeled on the North Carolina Predatory Lending Act
("NCPLA"), 3 1 which was enacted in 1999 and was the first such law in
the nation.3 2 The NCPLA included restrictions on "high cost"
mortgages as well as various prohibitions on predatory lending
practices such as "flipping" a loan3 3 and encouraging default in
connection with refinancing the loan.34 North Carolina passed this
legislation in response to the harm that predatory lenders were
causing residents of the state and the perceived weakness of federal
laws in responding to this problem.35 When the GFLA was enacted in
2002,36 it was the strongest antipredatory lending law in the nation. 37
While containing many of the same provisions as the NCPLA, the
GFLA went beyond North Carolina's law by prohibiting certain kinds
of late fees, prohibiting foreclosure without written notice, and
requiring arbitration in a forum that is convenient to the borrower.38
29. See Berner & Grow, supra note 10, at 36 (quoting North Carolina Attorney
General Roy Cooper's accusation that the OCC "took 50 sheriffs off the job during the
time the mortgage lending industry was becoming the Wild West"); Eric Nalder, Mortgage
System Crumbled While Regulators Jousted, SEATTLE PoST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 11,
2008, at Al (describing the 2003 preemption by the OCC of Washington state's attempted
enforcement of its Consumer Loan Act against National City Mortgage's loan practices).
30. See Notice, OCC Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264,
46,266 (Aug. 5, 2003); Georgia Fair Lending Act, No. 488, 2002 Ga. Laws 455 (codified as
amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -11 (2003)).
31. Act of July 22, 1999, ch. 332, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1202 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 24).
32. See C. Bailey King, Jr., Preempdon and the North Carolina Predatory Lending
Law, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 377, 379-82 (2004).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c) (2010). "Flipping" occurs when a lender encourages
a borrower to unnecessarily refinance in order to generate fees for the lender. Id.
34. § 24-10.2(d).
35. See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., N.C. Comm'r of Banks, North Carolina's Predatory
Lending Law: It's [sic] Adoption and Implementation, Address at the Annual Meeting of
the National Conference of State Legislatures (July 26, 2002), http://www.nccob.org/NR/
rdonlyres/39846629-Bl51-4538-9D33-
7867A 19ED2CC/0/PredatoryLendingLaw speech.pdf.
36. Georgia Fair Lending Act, No. 488, 2002 Ga. Laws 455 (codified as amended at
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -11 (2003)).
37. See Wookbai Kim, Challenging the Roots of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The
OCC's Operating Subsidiaries Regulation and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 21 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 278, 286 (2009); see also King, supra note 32, at 382-83 (comparing
the GFLA with the NCPLA).
38. SeeKing, supra note 32, at 382-83.
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In response to the GFLA, National City Corporation of Indiana, a
national bank, requested that the OCC determine whether its
subprime lending subsidiary, First Franklin Financial, could continue
lending in Georgia.3 9 In its Preemption Determination and Order, the
OCC concluded that "the provisions of the GFLA affecting national
banks' real estate lending are preempted by Federal law."'
Tensions between the OCC and the states culminated in the
promulgation of the OCC's 2004 rule supposedly clarifying the
Barnett Bank standard of preemption.4 1 This rule declared that, apart
from explicit preemption, state laws would be preempted if they
"obstruct, impair, or condition" a national bank's exercise of its
powers under the NBA.4 2 Further, the 0CC stated in this rule that its
revised preemption standards would apply to operating subsidiaries
of national banks to the same extent that they apply to their parent
banks;43 thus, state regulation of these operating subsidiaries could be
preempted to the same extent as state regulation of national banks."
The 0CC has argued at length that its preemption determination was
simply a restatement of prior Supreme Court standards, including
Barnett Bank.45
39. See Berner & Grow, supra note 10, at 40.
40. Notice, OCC Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,266
(Aug. 5, 2003).
41. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2010)). This regulation also
defined the OCC's visitorial powers under section 484(a) of the NBA to include "(i)
Examination of a bank; (ii) Inspection of a bank's books and records; (iii) Regulation and
supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law, and (iv)
Enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those
activities." 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2010). The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of
visitorial powers in finding the OCC's ability to exclude states from the enforcement of
nonpreempted state laws against national banks as an "unreasonable" interpretation of
their visitorial powers. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715-20
(2009). Thus, the OCC cannot preempt a state's attempt to enforce nonpreempted state
law against a national bank. Id.
42. See12 C.F.R. §7.4008 (2010).
43. See id. A bank's operating subsidiaries are corporations, limited liability
companies, or other similar entities in which the bank has an ownership interest of greater
than fifty percent. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (2010). An operating subsidiary of a national bank has
many of the same powers as its parent bank but may not accept deposits. See generally
BRO OME & MARKHAM, supra note 15, at 223-24 (describing the powers of a national
bank's operating subsidiaries).
44. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1913.
45. See id. at 1910 (arguing that the standard expressed in the regulation was intended
by the OCC as "the distillation of the various preemption constructs articulated by the
Supreme Court ... and not as a replacement construct that is in any way inconsistent with
those standards").
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Contrary to the OCC's view of its 2004 rule, there is reason to
believe that the 0 CC went beyond clarifying Barnett Bank and in fact
made it much easier for the OCC to preempt state laws than the
Barnett Bank standard would allow.4 6 In fact, the effect of the 0 CC's
rule was to negate the application of any state's antipredatory lending
laws to national banks and their subsidiaries, and thus it led to the de
facto adoption of field preemption in this area.47 Strong evidence that
the OCC implicitly adopted field preemption can be found in the
OCC's own assertion that "the preemption regulations adopted by
the 0CC are substantially identical to the preemption regulations of
the [OTS] that have been applicable ... for a number of years."4 8 It is
therefore useful to compare the OCC's 2004 rule with the OTS's
ability to preempt state regulation. It turns out there is not much
difference.
The O TS has declared that it "occupies the entire field of lending
regulation for federal savings associations."4 9 The OTS's field
preemption meant that virtually all state laws that regulated any of
the lending activities of federal savings associations would be
preempted by the OTS, including laws regulating licensing, terms of
credit, fees, and the "[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or
purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages." 0 The only
state laws not preempted by the OTS's claim to field preemption
were those concerning contracts, real property law, tort law, criminal
law, and those laws that have "only an incidental effect on lending
operations.""
While the OCC claimed that it was not adopting field
preemption in its 2004 rule, the scope of the laws preempted by this
rule suggests otherwise.52 Just as the OTS claimed preemption for a
broad category of state lending laws, the OCC listed twelve kinds of
lending regulation that would not apply to national banks, such as
licensing and registration, loan-to-value ratios, terms of credit
46. See Wilmarth, supra note 23, at 249-52. But see Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L.
Perkins, Nadonal Bank Act Preempdon: The OCC's New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to
Consumer Protection or the Dual Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365,
368-72 (2004) (defending the OCC's understanding of the rule as "clarifying" Barnett
Bank and past Supreme Court decisions).
47. For a detailed presentation of this argument, some of which is summarized below,
see Wilmarth, supra note 23, at 234-37.
48. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1914.
49. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010).
50. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b).
51. Id.
52. SeeWilmarth, supra note 23, at 234.
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(including amortization and minimum payments), the use of credit
reports, disclosure and advertising, and processing, origination, or
servicing mortgages.53 Furthermore, the limited state laws that the
OCC said would not be preempted included contract, criminal, and
tort law, or those laws which "the 0CC determines to be incidental to
the real estate lending operations of national banks."5 4 The OCC's
decision to establish specific areas of state regulation as preempted,
while simultaneously acknowledging other areas that are not, strongly
resembles the O TS's field preemption rule.
As this Part demonstrates, federal regulators have had wide
latitude over the past decade to preempt state laws regulating
national banks and thrifts. The OCC's 2004 preemption rule, in
particular, sparked a fierce debate about the wisdom of federal
regulators applying such a broad preemption power to the states. The
next Part discusses this debate and argues that preemption presents
policymakers with a difficult dilemma since both sides have legitimate
concerns.
II. THE PREEMPTION DILEMMA: EFFICIENCY VERSUS STRONG
CONSUMER PROTECTION
During the past decade, a debate has arisen over what might be
called a preemption dilemma. On one side there are those who
support the ability of federal regulators to prevent state laws from
applying to national banks and thrifts.56 Adherents believe that
federal regulators should have strong preemption powers not only
because of constitutional concerns, but also for economic reasons:
clear, consistent, nationwide laws and regulations promote efficiency
and reduce the cost of credit for consumers.7 Opponents, however,
hold that states ought to have the ability to implement strong
consumer protection laws because federal regulators cannot be
trusted to do a good job protecting consumers. 8 If these two
arguments are true, a dilemma follows: federal preemption of strong
state consumer protection laws both helps and hurts consumers. As it
turns out, there are good reasons for both positions, or, at the very
53. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2010).
54. Id.
55. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b).
56. See John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Remarks Before Women in Housing and Finance 7-10 (Sept. 24, 2009),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2009/pub-speech-2009-112.pdf.
57. See Joseph R. Mason et al., The Economic Impact of Eliminatwng Preempdon of
State Consumer Protecdon Laws, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 781, 792,794-800 (2010).
58. SeeWilmarth, supra note 23, at 232.
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least, there is not strong evidence that either side of the debate is
wrong.
A. How Preemption Benefits Consumers
There are several economic benefits alleged to result from
federal preemption of state regulations of national banks and thrifts.
First, preemption can promote competition by preventing states from
protecting certain kinds of domestic industries and companies. 59 For
example, the 0CC has sent letters to states warning them of conflicts
with federal laws when states have tried to restrict out-of-state
national banks from selling annuities, acting as fiduciaries, and
opening ATMs. 0 Each of these restrictions would have likely caused
increased cost or inconvenience to consumers as a result of limiting
the ability of out-of-state national banks to compete with local
banks.61 Second, as a result of the nature of interstate banking,
various OCC officials have argued for uniform, nationwide banking
laws in order to promote efficiency by reducing compliance costs.6 2 A
senior economic advisor at the OCC has presented empirical
evidence that preemption has been especially beneficial for smaller
interstate national bank holding companies.63 Although this
researcher acknowledged that there are relatively few empirical
studies on the cost effects of banking regulations,' there is evidence
that banks have substantial compliance costs when they must respond
to state regulation.6 5 Even Professors Warren and Bar-Gill, who
criticized the effects of federal preemption over the past decade, have
acknowledged that "[i]n an era of interstate banking, uniform
regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level may well
59. See Mason et al., supra note 57, at 793.
60. See id. at 793-94.
61. Seeid.
62. SeeDugan, supra note 56, at 7-9; see also Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma,
Federal Preemption and FederalBankingAgencyResponses to PredatoryL ending, 59 Bus.
LAW. 1193, 1201 (2004) (discussing the OCC's approach to combating predatory lending
through "the extensive, comprehensive supervisory systems it administers for national
banks").
63. See Gary Whalen, The Wealth Effects of OCC Preemption Announcements After
the Passage of the Georgia Fair Lending Act 3, 22-30 (Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 2004-4, 2004), available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/economics-working-papers/2008-
2000/wp2004-4.pdf.
64. Seeid. at 7.
65. See id. at 8. These costs are largely based on the need for highly trained legal and
management staff for compliance. See id.
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be more efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules that vary
from state to state.""
Some have suggested that the OCC has a self-interested motive
in arguing that it needs federal preemption in order to promote
uniform, nationwide laws for national banks, since its funding comes
from assessments on the national banks that it regulates. 67 The
allegation is that because the 0CC wants to keep as many banks with
a national charter as possible and attract more banks to a national
charter, it has chosen to take a very strong stance on preemption in
order to make the national charter more attractive.' However, a
report by the Government Accountability Office found that there is
no evidence showing that preemption plays a role in a bank deciding
to adopt a national charter over a state charter.6 9 Furthermore,
assuming for the sake of argument that the 0CC has a self-interested
reason to preempt state laws, the OCC still has a sound economic
rationale for preemption. Even state regulators who have argued for
stronger state consumer protection laws have agreed with national
banks that preemption promotes efficiency in the banking industry.70
Thus, the OCC appears to have had legitimate economic reasons to
preempt state laws that conflicted with federal laws. However, while
the 0 CC has had a strong economic rationale for preemption, there is
little doubt that preemption has harmed consumers.
B. How Preemption Has Harmed Consumers
The other side of the debate is that federal preemption of state
consumer financial protection laws has harmed consumers. First,
there are federalism concerns about preemption." While there is no
66. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 83.
67. SeeWilmarth, supra note 23, at 232.
68. See id.
69. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-387, OCC PREEMPTION
RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS 9 (2006) ("Based on our work, no conclusion
can be made about the role, if any, the preemption rules had ... on future charter
choices.").
70. Seeid. at 33.
71. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Stil Mortgaging the American Dream.- Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1359-62
(2006); see also Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment- A Riposte to Nadonal
Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981,
1030-32 (2006) (arguing that principles of federalism that have been applied to the
interaction of federal courts and state courts, such as comity and state sovereignty, are
analogous to the interaction between federal and state regulation of the financial
industry).
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doubt that Congress has the constitutional authority to preempt
conflicting state laws, the question is whether Congress should use
this authority in the case of consumer finance.72 Local authorities,
such as mayors, governors, and attorneys general, will likely be more
responsive to consumers in their states than the federal government,
since they will more easily hear whether these consumers are being
harmed by financial products and practices.73 Also, a strong power of
preemption will remove the "laboratories of democracy" effect of
state regulation, and thus stifle consumer protection innovation.74 It is
implausible that the federal government will always know the best
solutions for consumer financial protection, especially considering the
varying needs of a large and diverse nation like the United States.
There is also empirical evidence supporting the view that federal
preemption of state consumer financial protection laws has harmed
consumers. In one study, researchers found that the OCC's 2004
preemption rule was followed by an increase in loan defaults as well
as riskier lending in those states whose antipredatory lending laws
were preempted, and it concluded that federal preemption has likely
been a cause of the foreclosure crisis.76 Notably, this study also found
that loans made by OCC-regulated mortgage lenders had a higher
rate of default than independent mortgage companies in states where
antipredatory lending laws were preempted."
Furthermore, there is evidence supporting the concern that the
federal government has not been able to adequately protect
consumers, and that preemption of state laws has removed badly
needed regulation.8 Professor Patricia McCoy testified before the
72. SeeForrester, supra note 71, at 1359.
73. See id. at 1361-62. The recent scandal involving national banks signing off on
foreclosures without adequately reviewing the paperwork is one compelling example of
how state regulators were faster to identify and respond to this problem than the federal
regulators. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulators Fla wed in Foreclosure Oversight, WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/07/
AR2010110704301.html?hpid=topnews.
74. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1324-25. North Carolina, for example, has
been an innovator in consumer financial protection, inspiring other states to follow its
lead. As discussed already, North Carolina was the first state in the nation to pass an
antipredatory lending law. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
75. See Forrester, supra note 71, at 1360-61.
76. See LEI DING ET AL., CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL
HILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING
LAWS ON THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 5 (2010).
77. See id.
78. See Regulatory Restructuring- Safeguarding Consumer Protection and the Role of
the Federal Reserve: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy & Tech.
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 11 (2009) [hereinafter McCoy Testimony]
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U.S. House Committee on Financial Services that five of the seven
largest failures of depository institutions in 2007 and 2008 were thrifts
regulated by the OTS, and their failures were in significant part due
to risky loans, including option adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs")
and "low documentation" and "no documentation" ARMs.7 9 A
notable case study in this area was the collapse of Washington Mutual
Bank, the largest depository institution to fail in U.S. history.80 The
OTS never issued binding rules requiring thrifts to stop their
predatory lending practices; instead, it merely engaged in "light
touch" regulation-as Professor McCoy put it-consisting of
guidelines, examinations, and informal agreements.8 ' The largest
thrifts ignored the OTS's "light touch" regulation, however, and
continued their predatory practice S.82
Unlike the OTS, the OCC did issue a rule banning loans that
primarily relied on collateral and were not based on the borrower's
ability to repay the loan.8 3 Professor McCoy testified, however, that
the rule was "vague in design and execution," and that national banks
and their subsidiaries mostly ignored it.84 Furthermore, contrary to
the OCC's assertion that national banks were not substantially
involved in predatory lending,85 Professor McCoy testified that, in
2005, the five largest national banks-Bank of America, JP Morgan
Chase Bank, Citibank, Wachovia Bank, and Wells Fargo-were all
involved in low documentation and no documentation loans, and they
ended up suffering substantial losses as a result of this activity.86 The
OCC's inadequate protection of consumers is shown dramatically by
the lack of enforcement measures that the OCC took to confront
abusive lending practices: of the 495 enforcement actions between
(statement of Prof. Patricia A. McCoy) (opining that "[flederal preemption might not
have devolved into a banking crisis of systemic proportions had OTS and the OCC
replaced state regulation . . .with a comprehensive set of binding rules").
79. See id.; Turmoil i the U S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic
Crisis- Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong.
23-24 (2008) [hereinafter Stein Testimony] (testimony of Eric Stein, Vice President,
Center for Responsible Lending).
80. See McCoy Testimony, supra note 78, at 12.
81. See id.
82. Seeid.
83. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2010).
84. See McCoy Testimony, supra note 78, at 13.
85. See News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Final
Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers; Includes Strong Standard to
Keep Predatory Lending out of National Banks 2 (Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.occ.gov/static/
news-issuances/news-releases/2004/nr-occ-2004-3.pdf ("[T]here is scant evidence that
regulated banks are engaged in abusive or predatory practices.").
86. See McCoy Testimony, supra note 78, at 13-14.
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2000 and 2006, only one concerned subprime lending. Moreover,
despite publishing an Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgage Product Risks in 2006, it appears that the O CC's guidance
was largely ignored." As the former senior vice president of the
Center for Responsible Lending, Eric Stein, testified to Congress,
"Countrywide booked $161 billion in payment option ARM loans
while it was under the watch of the OCC, but 86% of those loans
could not meet the interagency guidelines."89
The considerations discussed above suggest that Bar-Gill and
Warren were correct when they stated that federal preemption would
not have been such a problem if the federal regulators had been more
aggressive in protecting consumers from harmful financial practices.'
The dilemma that preemption presented for federal regulators was in
large part a consequence of federal inaction. However, the
preemption dilemma-as well as the debate about preemption-is
likely to change significantly in the future. There is reason to believe
that Dodd-Frank creates a state and federal structure that promotes
the economic values underlying preemption while at the same time
promising stronger consumer financial protections. This Recent
Development next discusses changes that Dodd-Frank makes to
consumer financial protection at the federal level, and how this
change helps resolve the preemption dilemma.
III. HOW THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU HELPS
RESOLVE THE PREEMPTION DILEMMA
An interesting consequence of Dodd-Frank's enactment is that
preemption will no longer pose as severe a dilemma as it has recently.
This view of the effect of Dodd-Frank on consumer financial
protection is based on two premises. First, the CFPB will have
substantial authority to enact and enforce tough, nationwide
consumer protections. Thus, the regulations it issues have the
potential to protect consumers without the economic costs usually
associated with state consumer protection. Because it is likely that
this agency will pursue stronger federal consumer financial protection
regulations and enforcement than in the past, there will be less
urgency for such laws at the state level. Second, Dodd-Frank has
given the states a substantial role in consumer protection, so they can
87. See Berner & Grow, supra note 10, at 36.
88. See Stein Testimony, supra note 79, at 22.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 83.
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serve as a second line of defense for consumers if federal regulation
proves to be ineffective or inadequate. Consequently, Dodd-Frank
restores some balance to the interaction of federal and state
consumer financial protection authority, and the new regulatory
structure it creates promises to make the preemption dilemma much
less challenging. This Part analyzes how the creation of the CFPB
helps resolve the preemption dilemma by strengthening federal
consumer financial protection.
A. A Regulator with Motivation andAuthority
The CFPB will be an independent agency housed within the
Federal Reserve System ("FRS").91 It will come into existence on the
"designated transfer date," July 21, 2011, when the consumer
protection authority of the other federal financial regulators will be
transferred to the Bureau.' Until that time, the secretary of the
treasury is responsible for setting up the CFPB.93 Although there has
been speculation that political opponents of the CFPB will try to
weaken or even eliminate the Bureau, the likelihood of these
opponents succeeding is small.9 4
The primary mission of the CFPB is to "implement and, where
applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for
consumer financial products and services and that [these markets] are
fair, transparent, and competitive."9 5 By focusing solely on consumer
91. See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41338, THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE X, THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 4 (2010).
92. See Cheyenne Hopkins, Date Setfor Shiftin Regs, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 2010, at
4,4. Federal agencies such as the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"),
OTS, and others that were responsible for enforcing federal consumer financial protection
laws before Dodd-Frank will continue exercising this authority until the designated
transfer date. CARPENTER, supra note 91, at 2.
93. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/cfpb.aspx (last visited Apr. 10,
2011).
94. See Brady Dennis, Republicans Target Regulatory Overhaul, WASH. POST, Dec.
25, 2010, at A 14. One reason why Dodd-Frank is unlikely to be repealed or significantly
changed in the near future is that it has proven to be very popular with the public. A
Gallup poll revealed that sixty-one percent of Americans approve of the legislation and
thirty-seven percent disapprove. Lydia Saad, Among Recent Bills Financial Reform a
Lone Plus for Congress, GALLUP (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/142967/
among-recent-bills-financial-reform-lone-plus-congress.aspx.
95. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1021, 124 Stat. 1376, 1979-80 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511 (West Supp.
2011)).
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protection, the Bureau promises to be much more effective at
preventing the kind of abusive lending practices to which the OCC
and the OTS were slow to respond. Moreover, the CFPB consolidates
the enforcement of existing federal consumer protection laws that
deal with financial products and services.96 These include the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, and the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA"), to name just a few of over a dozen federal
laws.97 Unlike in the past, when responsibility for enforcing consumer
financial protection laws was given to regulators whose primary
mission was not consumer protection,98 a single regulator, the CFPB,
is now responsible for enforcing these laws.99 This will make
enforcement of these laws occur faster and more frequently, thereby
reducing the lag time between innovation in the financial industry and
regulatory responses."oo
In order to achieve its mission, the CFPB has authority to
regulate a wide range of financial products and services including
extensions of credit, servicing loans, debt collection, taking deposits,
check cashing, credit counseling, debt management, and credit report
services.' The entities over which the CFPB will be the primary
consumer protection regulator include depository institutions with
assets greater than $10 billion as well as certain nondepository
institutions such as mortgage servicers and originators, loan
modification or foreclosure relief services, and payday lenders.1 0 The
financial regulators that have traditionally had consumer protection
authority (such as the OCC and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC")) will continue to have this authority over
those financial entities not covered by the CFPB, such as depository
institutions with assets less than $10 billion.10 3
The CFPB's core consumer protection functions will include
rulemaking, enforcement, and oversight.104 Dodd-Frank gives the
96. See CARPENTER, supra note 91, at 5-6.
97. Seeid. at 6.
98. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 90 ("These agencies are designed with a
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. This means
protecting banks' profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority that
consists largely of enforcing Truth-in-Lending disclosure rules.").
99. See§ 1021(b), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511).
100. See R. Christian Bruce, Consumer Protecdon: Retail Bank Firms, Fearing a
Buzzsa w, Eye New Compliance Tests for Fairness, BANKING DAILY, Aug. 31,2010, at D3.
101. See§ 1002(15), 124 Stat. at 1957-60 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481).
102. §§ 1024-1026, 124 Stat. at 1987-95 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5514-5516).
103. CARPENTER, supra note 91, at 8.
104. See generallyid. (providing a detailed overview of the CFPB's powers in each of
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Bureau the power to "prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance,
as may be necessary or appropriate . .. to administer and carry out
the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws,
and to prevent evasions thereof."05 In addition to the Bureau's power
to adopt rules enforcing federal consumer financial laws that are
already enacted, Dodd-Frank gives the Bureau the power to prohibit
"unfair, deceptive, or abusive" acts or practices in the financial
industry.106 The CFPB can only designate an act or practice as
"unfair" if it causes or is likely to cause "substantial injury" to
consumers and is not "reasonably avoidable" by consumers, and if
this injury is not "outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition."" An "abusive" act or practice is one that
"materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service" or that
takes "unreasonable advantage" of a consumer's misunderstanding,
reasonable reliance, or inability to protect his or her own interests.' 0
In order to enforce the federal consumer financial laws and the rules
that the CFPB adopts, the Bureau may initiate investigations of
financial companies and issue subpoenas.1" Further, the CFPB may
initiate civil actions in federal court against companies believed to
have violated the Bureau's rules or federal consumer financial laws.110
Dodd-Frank also gives the CFPB the authority to seek civil penalties
for violations of these regulations and laws."' As for oversight, the
CFPB has the power to examine and require reports from financial
entities that it regulates. 1 12
The Bureau promises to have a large budget, increasing the
likelihood it will be effective in exercising its powers. Dodd-Frank
allows the CFPB to take a maximum of 10% of the FRS's total
operating expenses in fiscal year ("FY") 2011, 11% in FY 2012, and
12% thereafter.11 3 In FY 2009, the FRS's total operating expenses
these areas).
105. § 1022, 124 Stat. at 1980-85 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512).
106. § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531).
107. § 1031(c)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531).
108. § 103 1(d)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531).
109. See§ 1052, 124 Stat. at 2019-25 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5562).
110. See§ 1054, 124 Stat. at 2028-29 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5564).
111. See§ 1055, 124 Stat. at 2029-31 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5565).
112. See CARPENTER, supra note 91, at 5.
113. § 1017(a), 124 Stat. at 1975-78 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497). The precise
mechanism for funding the Bureau is not entirely clear from the statute, but it appears to
give the director of the Bureau significant control over the process:
Each year (or quarter of such year), beginning on the designated transfer date, and
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were $4.98 billion, so 10% would be approximately $500 million.1 14 By
comparison, for FY 2010, Congress appropriated $291.7 million for
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").1 Unlike the CFPB, only
part of the FTC is focused on consumer protection, since its other
major function is to focus on antitrust and competition issues.116
Finally, if the director of the CFPB determines that the funding level
provided by the FRS is insufficient for the Bureau to effectively
exercise its authority, a provision in Dodd-Frank authorizes
additional appropriations up to $200 million for fiscal years 2010
through 2014.117 But just as important as the size of the agency's
budget, the funding mechanism for the CFPB cannot be reviewed by
Congress, 118 so the Bureau's funding is largely independent of politics.
Given the CFPB's sweeping powers to enforce consumer
financial laws and regulations, and given the significant resources
provided to the Bureau that cannot be threatened by Congress's
appropriations process, the Bureau has the potential to be a powerful
federal agency.119 If it turns out to be effective, the CFPB could help
resolve the bitter preemption debates of the past decade. Addressing
the concerns of one side of the preemption debate, the extensive
power of the CFPB and its potential to be an effective federal
each quarter thereafter, the Board of Governors shall transfer to the Bureau from
the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System, the amount determined by
the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau
under Federal consumer financial law, taking into account such other sums made
available to the Bureau from the preceding year (or quarter of such year).
Id. The use of the word "shall" in reference to the Board of Governors' transfer of funds
to the Bureau suggests that the board cannot veto or provide less than the amount of
funds that the director determines is "reasonably necessary" for the agency to effectively
exercise its authority.
114. See CARPENTER, supra note 91, at 5.
115. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
SUMMARY 38 (2010). The Bureau's budget will still be small in comparison with other
federal agencies. The Environmental Protection Agency's enacted budget for FY 2010 was
$10.3 billion. EPA's Budget and Spending, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2011). Of course, the
budget for both of these agencies is miniscule in comparison to the Department of
Defense's enacted budget for FY 2010, which was $660.3 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST 1-2 (2010).
116. See About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last updated June 17, 2010).
117. § 1017(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 1979 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497).
118. See§ 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1976 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497).
119. Discussing the CFPB, Ed Yingling, the president and chief executive of the
American Bankers Association, has stated that "[i]n many ways, it is the most powerful
agency ever created." Last Week in Words, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at 2, 2. While this
statement may be too strong, it provides insight into how banking leaders view the CFPB.
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regulator should satisfy consumer protection advocates and state
attorneys general who have felt compelled to act to fill the gaps
created by weak federal regulation. As further explained below, the
CFPB will be much more receptive to concerns about consumer
protection raised at the state level than the 0 CC or the O TS were. At
the same time, the CFPB will address the concerns of the other side
of the preemption debate: nationwide laws and regulations enforced
by the CFPB will have the consistency and uniformity that supporters
of preemption have argued were lacking in state consumer protection
laws. Despite these benefits of the CFPB, there are several serious
objections to the argument that the CFPB can help resolve the
preemption dilemma.
B. WorriesA bout New Effciency Problems, the FSO C, and Agency
Capture
One potential objection to the argument that the CFPB will help
resolve the preemption dilemma is that, under Dodd-Frank, the
CFPB provides a floor rather than a ceiling on consumer financial
protection regulation. Section 1041(a)(2) states that "a statute,
regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in any State is not
inconsistent with the provisions of this title if the protection that such
statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords to consumers is
greater than the protection provided under this title." 120 This
provision is somewhat unclear, 121 but it arguably means that if a
state's consumer financial protection laws are stronger than any laws
or regulations that the CFPB may enforce, then that state law will not
be preempted by any federal consumer laws in Dodd-Frank or rules
promulgated by the CFPB based on those laws.122 If this is the case,
then there is a possibility of a patchwork of consumer protection laws
across all fifty states, seemingly undermining the claim here that
Dodd-Frank can help promote uniformity in consumer financial
protection law.
In response to this objection, the argument of this Recent
Development is not that Dodd-Frank will completely eliminate the
120. Id.
121. For example, as more fuily developed below, it is unclear how section 1041(a)(2)
relates to the preemption provisions that concern the NBA and the Home Owners Loan
Act ("HOLA") in sections 1044 and 1046, respectively. It is also unclear whether section
1041(a)(2) means that those more protective state laws are entirely protected from
preemption, since section 104 1(a) does not mention preemption.
122. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 15, at 369-71; CARPENTER, supra note 91,
at 14.
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efficiency problems associated with laws that vary from state to state.
Rather, because of the power given to the CFPB by Dodd-Frank, this
agency will have the capacity to pass and enforce strong regulations
that will increase the effectiveness of federal regulation of the
financial industry and thereby reduce the need for state regulation.
As a result, the need for federal regulators to preempt state law will
decline, and the dilemma that preemption presents will not be as
significant. Although improved federal regulation promises to reduce
the need for state laws, it will not by any means eliminate the
importance of state regulation, or eliminate inconsistency between
such laws from state to state. There are still likely to be conflicting
state consumer laws after Dodd-Frank, but because of the CFPB, the
economic rationale for preempting these laws will not be as strong as
in the past. Furthermore, as more filly developed below, section
1041(a) seems to be limited to the consumer protection laws
transferred to the CFPB and the rules based on them; state laws that
are inconsistent with the NBA and the Home Owners Loan Act
("HOLA") may still be preempted, though Dodd-Frank makes it
harder for federal regulators to do so. 123
Another potential objection to the argument developed here is
that even if the CFPB helps resolve efficiency problems created by
differing state consumer protection laws, the CFPB may create new
efficiency problems.124 For example, the Bureau's efforts to protect
consumers from unfair or abusive practices may result in decreased
lending or limit the ability of financial companies to innovate and
provide new products to consumers.125 Leaders in the banking
industry have argued that the CFPB's power to regulate "abusive"
financial practices will lead to significant uncertainty, since unlike the
terms "unfair" and "deceptive," the term "abusive" does not have an
established legal meaning. 126 Furthermore, it might be argued that
because the CFPB is exclusively focused on consumer protection, it
may adopt regulations or take enforcement actions without any
concern for the safety and soundness of the depository institutions it
regulates. 127 The CFPB could end up harming these institutions, and
123. See § 1044, 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §25b); § 1046, 124 Stat. at
2017-18 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1465).
124. See Thomas P. Vartanian, Vievpoit: Watch Dodd-Frank Sleeper Provisions, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 10, 2010, at 8, 8.
125. See Cheyenne Hopkins, 'Chilling Effect' of Abusive' i Dodd-Frank, AM.
BANKER,Nov. 23, 2010, at 1, 1.
126. Id.
127. For example, the chairman of the FDIC, Sheila Bair, argued that separating
consumer financial protection regulation from safety and soundness regulation would
1292 [Vol. 89
PREEMPTIONAND DODD-FRANK
in turn harm consumers.12 8 So, the charge is that the CFPB has merely
shifted the problem in the preemption dilemma: instead of
inefficiency stemming from inconsistent state regulation, the Bureau
itself could harm consumers by limiting the ability of financial
companies to innovate and lend. By resolving one dilemma, the
Bureau may create another.
There are several responses to these concerns. First, as already
noted, the CFPB may not declare a financial act or practice "unfair,
deceptive, or abusive" if the injury to consumers is "outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition."1" Thus, the
CFPB must carefully balance the benefit to consumers from its
rulemaking with the potential costs. Second, before adopting any new
rules, the CFPB must first consult with the other federal financial
regulators during the comment phase.13 0 If one of these regulators
objects to a rule that the CFPB chooses to adopt, the CFPB must
include the objection and the Bureau's response in its notice to the
public.131 This will allow agencies like the OCC to have some
influence over the CFPB's rulemaking decisions and force the Bureau
to publicly argue that its rules will not reduce lending, stifle
innovation, harm the soundness of banks, or increase the costs of
financial products and services. A third response, and perhaps the
strongest, is that Dodd-Frank constrains the CFPB through the newly
created Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"). 13 2 The
FSOC's voting members include the secretary of the treasury, who
acts as chair, and federal financial regulators (including the director
of the CFPB).133 The FSOC is responsible for "identifying threats to
the financial stability of the United States; promoting market
discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the
United States financial system."134 The FSOC has the power to set
aside or stay the adoption of a rule by the CFPB if it believes the rule
"would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking
undermine both goals. See Regulatory Perspectves on the Obama Administration 's
Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. 69 (2009) (statement of Sheila Bair, Chairman, FDIC).
128. See id.
129. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1031(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (West Supp.
2011)).
130. § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512).
131. § 1022(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512).
132. See§ 111, 124 Stat. at 1392 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321).
133. Id.
134. Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treas.gov/FSOC/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at
risk."135 Upon the request of any member of the FSOC, and if two-
thirds of its members agree, the FSOC may stay the adoption of one
of the CFPB's rules for a maximum of ninety days.136 Further, the
FSOC may set aside one of the CFPB's rules if two-thirds of its
members vote to do so. 13 7
The power that the FSOC will have to stay or set aside the
CFPB's regulations raises the concern that the preemption dilemma
may reappear in the same form. If the FSOC may veto the CFPB
whenever it finds that its regulations or enforcements pose a threat to
the economy, the CFPB may turn out to be ineffective in protecting
consumers. This may lead states to adopt tougher consumer
protection regulations than the federal regulators, once again
presenting the dilemma of whether the federal government should
preempt these state laws. Furthermore, there is always the possibility
of regulatory "capture," where an agency becomes subservient to the
interests of the industry it is attempting to regulate.138 An obvious way
that the CFPB could fall to regulatory capture would be if the
director of the CFPB is more interested in protecting the financial
industry than consumers.13 9 Other means of capture could involve the
financial industry having greater access to senior staff in the CFPB
than consumers or their advocates and thereby tilting policymaking
decisions by the agency in the direction of the industry's interests and
away from the interests of consumers.14 If the FSOC or regulatory
capture undermines the CFPB's ability to protect consumers, states
may feel the need to pass their own consumer protection laws again,
and the issue of preemption returns.
In response to these concerns, the two-thirds majority
requirement for the FSOC to set aside one of the CFPB's regulations
is likely to be a high bar to meet. Since there are ten voting members
on the FSO C,141 and the director of the CFPB is a member, the
135. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5513).
136. § 1023(c), 124 Stat. at 1985-86 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5513).
137. Seeid. Setting aside a CFPB rule makes it unenforceable. See id.
138. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulatng Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REV. 15, 21 n.23 (2010) (defining "capture" as
"responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups being regulated").
139. One well-known means of capture, called the "revolving-door" phenomenon,
occurs when the head of an agency is influenced by the potential for future employment in
the industry and, as a result, regulates that industry lightly. See id. at 23.
140. See id. at 22 ("Industry groups are . . . better positioned to monitor agencies
closely and to challenge any and all agency decisions that will negatively affect them.").
141. § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321).
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director would need to persuade just three other members in order to
defeat any attempt to set aside one of the Bureau's regulations.
Regulatory capture is likely the most serious threat to the potential of
the CFPB to be an effective agency, but there are aspects of the
agency's design which could prevent this result. First, the director is
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to a five-year
term and may only be removed from office by the president for
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."1 4 2 This
provides the director with a degree of independence from any
potential political pressure from a president who may disagree with
the policy choices of the CFPB.143 At the same time, the funding
mechanism for the CFPB provides it with significant independence
from the political process in Congress. The Bureau is not funded
through the regular appropriation process, but rather gets its funding
through an assessment on the FRS's annual total operating
expenses.144 As a result, Dodd-Frank takes steps to insulate the CFPB
from political pressure from both Congress and the president. 14 5 Of
course, this could cut both ways: the Bureau could ignore Congress's
wishes to be more aggressive on the consumer protection front, or it
could ignore Congress's wishes for it to be less aggressive. A lot
depends, therefore, on the staffing of the Bureau, and most especially,
who serves as director.
The early signs suggest that those staffing the CFPB will fight
against agency capture. On September 17, 2010, President Obama
appointed Professor Elizabeth Warren to help Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner establish the Bureau.1" Because of political
challenges, President Obama did not nominate Warren to become the
director of the CFPB. 147 Nevertheless, Warren's role has provided her
with the opportunity to create a strong Bureau that could resist
attempts of the financial industry or the Bureau's ideological
opponents to weaken it.14 Although Warren was appointed on a
142. § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5491).
143. See Barkow, supra note 138, at 28 ("Empirical studies on when Congress opts for
good-cause provisions support the view that this design feature seems largely aimed at
stopping presidential pressure in particular and not necessarily at preventing interest
group or partisan influence in general.").
144. See CARPENTER, supra note 91, at 5.
145. See generally Barkow, supra note 138 (describing ways in which independent
agencies can be designed in order to insulate them from capture and noting that for-cause
removal and independent funding are two key elements of this design).
146. Jackie Calmes & Sewell Chan, Obama Chooses Warren to Set Up Consumer
Bureau, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18,2010, at B5.
147. Id.
148. Warren is one of the strongest advocates of consumer financial protection in the
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temporary basis, she has served as the de facto head of the CFPB. 149
Warren has had wide latitude to hire staff and establish a culture at
the CFPB, leaving an imprint on the Bureau which will likely last long
after she leaves. 150 In fact, within the first few months of her tenure,
Warren had already hired about 100 high-level staffers to assist with
setting up the Bureau.
In spite of these reasons for optimism that the CFPB will be able
to fulfill its mission, capture remains a serious threat: considering the
lobbying power of the financial industry, it will likely be aggressive in
its attempt to capture the CFPB. It would be naive to suppose that
simply because an agency has had strong leadership early on, and has
several design features built into it which make it less likely to be
captured, that it is therefore immune to capture.15 2 Fortunately,
Dodd-Frank provides an important safeguard for consumers in case
the CFPB turns out to be ineffective. That safeguard is the increased
power that Dodd-Frank gives the states. In fact, this element of the
law may help protect the CFPB from capture, as more fully explained
below, since Dodd-Frank allows the states to serve as a very
important check on the federal government's role in consumer
financial protection. First, Dodd-Frank weakens the ability of federal
regulators to preempt state consumer financial protection laws, thus
strengthening the states' power to pass such laws.153 Second, states
nation, and her ability to persuade Congress and President Obama to adopt her idea of the
CFPB is a testament to her effectiveness. See Joe Nocera, Consumers Clamoring for a
Leader, N.Y. TIvms, Aug. 21, 2010, at Bl. Furthermore, her dual placement as both an
assistant to President Obama in the White House and as a special advisor to the treasury
secretary has likely given her a significant amount of power and influence. As an "assistant
to the president," Warren has a title that is also "held by [other] senior White House
advisors." Calmes & Chan, supra note 146.
149. Technically, the treasury secretary serves as the director for this period of time.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1066, 124 Stat. 1376, 2055 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5586 (West Supp. 2011)).
However, Secretary Geithner has given Warren most of the responsibilities of the director.
See Sudeep Reddy, Consumer Agency's Path Will Be Set by First Chief WALL ST. J., July
6,2010, at A4.
150. SeeReddy, supra note 149.
151. Ben Protess, Consumer Watchdog Builds Up Its Ranks, N.Y. TIvMs, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/consumer-watchdog-builds-up-its-ranks/.
152. Another serious problem that the CFPB may face is finding a director who can be
confirmed by the Senate. Until a permanent director is confirmed, the Bureau's powers
are limited-it cannot adopt new rules and it cannot regulate nonbank financial
companies. See Sheryl H arris, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Finding Its Footing,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 12, 2011, http://www.cleveland.com/
consumeraffairs/index.ssf/2011/02/consumer financialprotection 1 .html.
153. Dodd-Frank weakens the standard of preemption for state laws that conflict with
the NBA and the HOLA, and it also adds procedural hurdles that both the OCC and the
1296 [Vol. 89
PREEMPTIONAND DODD-FRANK
have new powers under Dodd-Frank to enforce federal law and to
influence federal consumer protection regulation.1 54 The next Part
discusses both of these features of the legislation and argues that
Dodd-Frank has created a structure of dynamic federalism in
consumer financial protection which goes further in resolving the
preemption dilemma than the CFPB is capable of on its own.
IV. THE WEAKENING OF PREEMPTION AND THE RISE OF DYNAMIC
FEDERALISM IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
A. Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection Authority for States
The first thing to note about Dodd-Frank's preemption
provisions is that they only apply to "state consumer financial laws,"
which are state laws that "directly and specifically regulat[e] the
manner, content, or terms and conditions of any financial transaction
... or any account related thereto, with respect to a consumer."
This provision means that the preemption provisions in Dodd-Frank
do not apply to basic contract laws or unfair and deceptive acts or
practices laws, which have traditionally been excluded from federal
preemption. 156 Another point is that the changes Dodd-Frank makes
to the preemption standards of the NBA and the HOLA do not go
into effect until the "designated transfer date" on July 21, 2011.157
However, only financial transactions made prior to the date that
Dodd-Frank was enacted (July 20, 2010) will be grandfathered in;
thus, the old preemption standard will apply to these transactions.
A final preliminary point is that, as discussed in the last Part, section
1041(a)(2) provides that "a statute, regulation, order, or
interpretation in effect in any State is not inconsistent with the
provisions of this title if the protection that such statute, regulation,
order, or interpretation affords to consumers is greater than the
protection provided under this title." 159 The preemption standards
courts must follow which make preemption more difficult. See § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-
17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b); § 1046(a), 124 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1465).
154. See, e.g., § 1041(c), 124 Stat. at2011-12 (codified at 12U.S.C.A. § 5551).
155. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
156. LAUREN SAUNDERS, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE ROLE OF THE STATES
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
OF 2010, at 7 (2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-
states.pdf.
157. § 1048, 124 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5582).
158. § 1043, 124 Stat. at 2014 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5553).
159. § 1041(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2011 (codified at 12U.S.C.A. § 5551).
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relating to the NBA and the HOLA, discussed below, are seemingly
distinct from any effect on preemption contained in section
1041(a)(2).160 But for all of the federal consumer laws to be enforced
by the CFPB, and the rules that the CFPB promulgates based on
these laws, section 1041(a)(2) seems to insulate from preemption
those state laws that are more protective of consumers than
comparable federal laws or regulations.
As for the preemption of state consumer financial laws by the
NBA or the HOLA, Dodd-Frank makes several amendments to these
federal statutes and sets out a multi-element standard of preemption.
First, with respect to the NBA or regulations issued under it, a state
consumer financial law is preempted if it has a "discriminatory effect
on national banks," meaning the law does not impact a state bank as
strongly as it would a national bank.161 Second, if a state consumer
financial law "prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by
the national bank of its powers," then it is preempted.16 2 Here, Dodd-
Frank expressly incorporates the standard of preemption from
Barnett Bank.163 Third, a state consumer financial law is preempted if
a federal law contains a provision that explicitly preempts that state
law." With respect to thrifts, Dodd-Frank eliminates the OTS and
transfers its powers to the Federal Reserve and the 0CC.165 The law's
amendment to HOLA replaces the OTS's field preemption standard
with the standard that it applies to state laws regulating national
banks, so that in both cases the conflict preemption standard of
Barnett Bank applies.166
Dodd-Frank significantly weakens the standard of preemption
articulated by the 0CC in its 2004 rule and the standard that the OTS
had applied to national thrifts. First, Dodd-Frank completely
eliminates the 0 CC's language that state laws would be preempted if
they "obstruct, impair, or condition" a national bank in exercising its
160. The preemption provisions in Dodd-Frank, including sections 1041(a)(2), 1044,
and 1046, are somewhat unclear and courts will undoubtedly spend a lot of time studying
them to determine Congress's intent. However, based on the language of the provisions
and their separate locations in the text of Dodd-Frank, a plausible interpretation is that
section 1041(a)(2) exempts state consumer protection laws from preemption by federal
consumer protection laws while sections 1044 and 1046 set a different preemption
standard based on the NBA and the HOLA.
161. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).
164. Id.
165. § 312(b), 124 Stat. at 1521-22 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5412).
166. See§ 1046(a), 124 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1465).
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powers.167 Instead of following this formulation, Dodd-Frank
explicitly and repeatedly uses the Barnett Bank language, requiring a
state law to "prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise by the
national bank of its powers."' This language is notably different
from the OCC's 2004 rule: Dodd-Frank makes no reference to a state
law being preempted if it puts conditions on the ability of a national
bank to exercise its powers, and Dodd-Frank requires significant
interference, whereas the OCC's 2004 formulation merely required
obstruction or impairment. Second, these changes are not
insignificant linguistic differences between the two formulations.
Section 1044 provides, as a rule of construction for the preemption
standard, that "[t]his title does not occupy the field in any area of
State law."' This explicit rejection of field preemption is strong
evidence that the preemption standard in Dodd-Frank is meant to
reject the de facto field preemption in the OCC's 2004 rule.170 Third, it
is worth remembering that the facts of BarnettBank involved a fairly
straightforward matter of conflict between state and federal laws: the
Florida statute stated that national banks could not sell insurance in
towns of less than 5,000 people while the federal statute said that
national banks could engage in this activity. So in Barnett Bank, a
single state law was preempted because it conflicted with a federal
law, and since Dodd-Frank repeatedly referenced this case in setting
its preemption standard while not referring to the 2004 OCC rule
even once, it is reasonable to conclude that it was favoring the conflict
preemption of BarnettBank over the de facto field preemption of the
0 CC's rule.
In opposition to this view of the standard of preemption in
Dodd-Frank, it has been argued that the law does not actually
overturn the OCC's 2004 rule because, during the legislative debate
over Dodd-Frank, Senator Thomas Carper deleted a provision that
would have explicitly invalidated the rule. 7 2 This is not, however,
conclusive evidence of Congress's intent since there is other evidence
of the legislative process that suggests the opposite conclusion. For
example, Congress rejected an amendment by Representative Melissa
Bean that would have required a state law to be preempted if it
167. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2010).
168. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
171. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., NA. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,27-29 (1996).
172. R. Christian Bruce, Federal Preempdon Remains Viable i Wake of Dodd-Frank,
BANKING DAILY, Feb. 14, 2011, at D13.
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"impairs or hampers" the exercise of a national bank's powers,
language that is similar to the "obstruct, impair, or condition"
language of the OCC's 2004 rule.' Thus, the legislative history does
not help those who would argue that Congress meant to keep the
0 CC's 2004 rule intact in Dodd-Frank.
Dodd-Frank also provides that state consumer financial laws may
"apply to a subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank ... to the same
extent that the State consumer financial law applies to any person,
corporation, or other entity subject to such State law."174 As a result
of this provision, states may regulate the operating subsidiaries of
national banks in the same way that they would regulate any other
business in the state."' Operating subsidiaries will no longer be
protected by the federal standard of preemption applied to national
banks.176
In addition to changes to the standard of preemption and its
applicability to operating subsidiaries, Dodd-Frank makes major
changes to the procedures that the 0CC and the courts must now use
in order to preempt state financial laws. For example, the law
requires that when the 0CC preempts a law, it must do so on a "case-
by-case basis.""' This requirement further shows how Dodd-Frank
reverses the OCC's 2004 rule, which carved out large areas of state
lending laws that could be applied to national banks and held that
they would be preempted.17 8 By contrast, Dodd-Frank directs the
OCC to determine that a specific state consumer financial law, and
those laws of other states with "substantively equivalent terms,"
ought to be preempted.179 The ability of the OCC to preempt other
state laws with "substantively equivalent terms" is constrained by the
requirement that the OCC must consult with the CFPB and take its
173. See SAUNDERS, supra note 156, at 6; Brady Dennis, House Steps Closer to Passing
Financial Reguladon Overhaul, WASH. PoST, Dec. 11, 2009, at A22. In fact, the
preemption language that was ultimately adopted was seen by some legislators as a
compromise between those who wanted to exempt states from being preempted when
they passed strong consumer protection laws and those who wanted a much stronger
preemption standard. SeeDennis, supra.
174. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
175. Seeid.
176. Observers believe that, because of this provision, national banks are likely to "roll
up" their operating subsidiaries so that they are part of the national bank and are
therefore protected by preemption. See Kate Berry, What to Do with Home Loan Units,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 23, 2010, at 1, 1.
177. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
178. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2010).
179. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
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views into consideration.80 In addition to requiring the OCC to
consult with the CFPB before issuing its preemption determinations,
Dodd-Frank also requires the OCC to provide "substantial evidence"
justifying that preemption of a state consumer financial law follows
the standard set out in BarnettBank.181
Another procedural change made by Dodd-Frank is the standard
of judicial review it creates for the OCC's preemption
determinations. 182 When courts review these determinations, they
must take into account "the consideration of the agency, the validity
of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid
determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court
finds persuasive and relevant to its decision."183 This standard of
review is in contrast to the deferential standard toward administrative
agencies taken by the courts and exemplified by Chevron v. National
Resources Defense Council.184 The Supreme Court has previously
stated that courts should not be deferential to federal agencies in
preemption cases, 18' but courts have ignored this advice in the past
and given the OCC Chevron-style deference, providing a "rubber
stamp" to the OCC's preemption determinations.18 6 As a result of the
standard of review set out in Dodd-Frank, courts will more likely be
skeptical of the O CC's preemption decisions than they would have
been before the legislation.
A final procedural change to preemption in Dodd-Frank is the
emphasis on the transparency of OCC preemption decisions. First,
Dodd-Frank requires the OCC to review its preemption decisions
every five years after the decision is made.18' During the review, the
OCC must notify the public and take public comments to garner
feedback about the specific preemption decision.88 After the review
is complete, the OCC must publish a notice in the Federal Register
explaining why the preemption determination should continue, or
why it should be rescinded. 189 Furthermore, when the 0CC completes
its review, it must submit a report of the review to Congress.190 These
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
185. SeeWatters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 40 (2007).
186. See SAUNDERS, supra note 156, at 6.
187. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b).
188. Seeid.
189. Seeid.
190. Seeid.
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requirements will force the OCC to publicly justify its preemption
decisions in a more rigorous manner than it has in the past, and the
requirements will force the OCC to consider correcting mistaken
preemption decisions. Increased political and public accountability
for the 0CC is likely to lead it to be more careful before it preempts
state laws.
All of these changes to federal preemption of state consumer
financial protection laws mean that if the CFPB does not do an
adequate job of protecting consumers, the states will be able to step
in and pass laws that have a better chance of avoiding preemption
than was the case before Dodd-Frank. But these changes to
preemption are not the only way that Dodd-Frank empowers states.
States have several new powers and roles in consumer financial
protection as a result of Dodd-Frank.
First, states can influence whether the CFPB adopts a new rule
or makes a change to an existing rule.191 If a majority of states pass a
resolution asking the CFPB to adopt or change a rule, then Dodd-
Frank requires the CFPB to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in
response to the states' request.'9 In considering whether to finalize a
proposal from the states, the CFPB must consider whether an existing
law already provides stronger consumer protection, whether the
benefits of the proposal would outweigh any potential costs to
consumers, and whether the proposal would harm the safety and
soundness of national banks.1 9 If the Bureau decides that it will not
adopt a suggested new or modified rule, it must publish an
explanation of its rationale in the Federal Register and provide a
copy to each state that requested the new rule or modification as well
as to the banking committees in Congress.1 94
Dodd-Frank also creates a right of action for state attorneys
general to enforce any regulations adopted by the CFPB.195
Importantly, state attorneys general may initiate civil actions against
national banks and thrifts in order to enforce the Bureau's
regulations.1" Before taking any action against a financial institution
to enforce CFPB regulations, state attorneys general must inform the
Bureau.197
191. § 1041(c), 124 Stat. at 2011-12 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5551).
192. § 1041(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2011.
193. § 1041(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2011-12.
194. § 1041(c)(3)(b), 124 Stat. at 2012.
195. § 1042(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5552).
196. § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2013.
197. § 1042(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 2013 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5552).
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By creating the CFPB, weakening federal preemption, and
extending new powers to states, Dodd-Frank will help resolve the
preemption dilemma. The combination of these elements has created
a structure of dynamic federalism in the field of consumer financial
protection. The concept of dynamic federalism has been discussed
recently in the context of both environmental law and securities
regulation," and as the implementation of Dodd-Frank proceeds, it
is likely that there will be increased discussion of dynamic federalism
in the context of consumer financial protection. *
B. How Dynamic Federalism Helps Resolve the Preemption
Dilemma
Erwin Chemerinsky has challenged the traditional conception of
federalism, which focuses on protecting state sovereignty from federal
interference.200 For Chemerinsky, "federalism should be re-
conceptualized as being about empowering government at all levels,
rather than limiting power. The genius of having multiple levels of
government is there are several different actors to advance rights and
liberties." 20 1  Chemerinsky has argued that the Supreme Court's
increasing willingness to preempt state laws undermines the values of
federalism.202 These values include greater democratic decision
making since local and state power is closer to the people; the
opportunity for states to "serve as laboratories for experimentation"
in order to determine which laws work and which do not; and the
greater protection of liberty that multiple levels of government offer
by serving as checks on each other.203 Therefore, based on concerns
about federalism, Chemerinsky proposes a very limited use of
preemption, under which only express and conflict preemption are
appropriate, and the latter should be used only where state and
198. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 12, at 170-73 (discussing dynamic federalism in the
context of environmental law); Jones, supra note 12, at 121-26 (discussing dynamic
federalism in the context of securities enforcement).
199. This discussion has already begun, with scholars noting how increasing state
power in consumer financial protection can play a key role in providing a check on federal
financial regulators, and thereby help insulate these regulators from capture. See Barkow,
supra note 138, at 53-55.
200. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1328-29; Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not
as Limits, Butas Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20 (1997).
201. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1315.
202. See id. at 1326 ("Preempting state laws limits the ability of states to make choices
that are responsive to their residents' desires, to experiment, and to advance liberty and
freedom within their boundaries. Simply put, a broad vision of inferred preemption
invalidates beneficial state laws.").
203. Seeid. at 1324-25.
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federal laws are "mutually exclusive.""2 According to this view of
federalism, the emphasis should not only be about protecting state
sovereignty; it is also important that the federal government is active
and empowered. Chemerinsky argues that "empowering each level
of government" is particularly important in light of the challenges of
205twenty-first century governance.
Other scholars have built on these ideas and have defended
dynamic federalism, encouraging a reassessment of the proper
balance between state and federal regulatory authority.2 06 As one
scholar has explained this concept, "Dynamic federalism . .. calls for
a passive approach on the part of the courts, leaving the states to their
own devices in terms of fending off attempts by the federal
government to defeat state regulation."2 07 This view of the proper
relationship between federal and state regulatory authority is
opposed to a static conception, where state or federal governments
208play an exclusive role in regulation. The view that the courts should
take a "passive" approach in the balance of federal and state power
encourages the political branches of our government to be
accountable for preemption. Requiring preemption only when
Congress's intent is unambiguous, as Chemerinsky proposes, 2 0
encourages greater political accountability for preemption decisions,
rather than leaving these decisions to unelected members of the
judiciary and the federal bureaucracy.
There are other features and benefits of dynamic federalism.
Renee M. Jones has described the hallmarks of dynamic federalism,
which she terms "vertical competition" and "regulatory dualism," as
involving regulatory competition and cooperation between different
levels of government. 210 The benefits of dynamic federalism include
protecting federal and state agencies from capture, maximizing scarce
government resources, and improving the responsiveness of
government.2 11
Dodd-Frank is a good example of "empowering government at
all levels" and promoting competition, cooperation, and overlapping
authority between state and federal consumer protection authorities.
204. Seeid. at 1329-30.
205. See Chemerinsky, supra note 200, at 1220.
206. See Engel, supra note 12, at 176.
207. Id. (citation omitted).
208. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1329.
209. See id. at 1329-30.
210. SeeJones, supra note 12, at 121-26.
211. Id. at 124-26.
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First, Dodd-Frank creates the CFPB and grants it significant power to
focus primarily on consumer financial protection. This represents
empowerment of government at the federal level. Second, by limiting
the ability of federal regulators to preempt state laws and by
providing state attorneys general with new powers of enforcement of
federal consumer protection laws, the states have been given
overlapping authority with the CFPB. Third, there have been early
signs of cooperation at the federal and state level: in January of 2011,
a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") was reached between the
CFPB and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors to "promote
consistent examination procedures and effective enforcement of state
and federal consumer laws and to minimize regulatory burden and
efficiently deploy supervisory resources." 212 This MOU indicates that
one of the benefits of dynamic federalism-maximization of scarce
government resources-promises to be one of the benefits of the
regulatory structure created by Dodd-Frank. The MOU also
emphasizes another point that brings this discussion back to the
preemption dilemma: state and federal cooperation to "minimize
regulatory burden."213 One of the challenges going forward for both
state and federal regulators will be to balance the values of economic
efficiency with the need for greater consumer financial protection.
The framework of dynamic federalism created by Dodd-Frank
has the potential to make significant progress in resolving the
preemption dilemma because of its encouragement of both
cooperation and competition between state and federal regulators. By
granting the CFPB significant powers as a federal consumer
protection agency, Dodd-Frank provides it with the power to set a
high federal floor of consumer protection, thereby reducing the need
for state regulation. Because the CFPB will be adopting nationwide
regulations, this will promote consistency and efficiency in the
financial industry. Moreover, although the states have greater
flexibility in passing their own consumer protection laws and avoiding
preemption, Dodd-Frank still enables the OCC to preempt those
21421
state laws that clearly conflict with the NBA Or the HOLA.215 Thus,
212. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Federal Consumer Agency to Partner
with State Regulators on Supervision of Providers of Consumer Financial Products and
Services, Including Mortgage Lenders, Private Student Lenders and Payday Lenders (Jan.
4, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tglO16.aspx.
213. Id.
214. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1044, 124 Stat. 1376, 2014-17 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 25b (West Supp.
2011)).
215. § 1046, 124 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1465).
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there are some constraints built into Dodd-Frank which help create a
balance between strong consumer protection and efficiency without
the need to give the 0 CC the heavy-handed preemption power that it
has claimed for itself in the past.
At the same time, Dodd-Frank helps meet the other side of the
preemption debate that argues for stronger consumer protections:
states' increased power gives them leverage in serving as a check on
the CFPB and other federal agencies, allowing them to pass tougher
consumer protections if the CFPB does not act effectively. If the
CFPB fails to adopt strong regulations as a result of capture or
because the FSOC undermines needed regulations, states may choose
to pass resolutions requesting the CFPB to adopt a new rule.216 Some
states could also threaten to pass their own consumer protection laws
in order to fill a perceived gap in regulation. As a result of this
pressure from the states, the Bureau may be convinced that there is a
need for national regulation in order to promote greater uniformity
across the nation while also providing greater protection for
consumers. Alternatively, the requirement that the CFPB must
explain why it is choosing not to adopt a rule may persuade states that
regulation would do more harm than good.217 In either case, it is
possible that the states will have no need for passing their own
consumer protection laws in this area, and the possibility of
preemption would be avoided. This is one way in which cooperation
between the states and the CFPB helps ease the preemption dilemma.
The power of states to enforce the CFPB's regulations illustrates
another way in which the preemption dilemma will be less serious
after Dodd-Frank. Since the states will now have a much more
significant role in consumer protection, they will be able to effectively
compete with the CFPB. If the CFPB fails to enforce certain
regulations that it has adopted, states will then be able to sue national
banks or national thrifts in order to enforce the CFPB's own
regulations.2 18 Since states will be able to enforce a federal regulator's
own rules, they may not need to pass their own consumer financial
protection laws as often as in the past in order to engage in their own
enforcement. By avoiding state legislation in this way, federal
regulators will be less prone to preempt state laws, and the
preemption dilemma will arise less frequently. In addition to
potentially reducing the need for preemption, the greater
216. § 1041(c), 124 Stat. at2011-12 (codified at 12U.S.C.A. § 5551).
217. Seeid.
218. See§ 1042, 124 Stat. at 2012-14 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5552).
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enforcement power given to the states may help prod the CFPB into
action and thereby help reduce the likelihood of capture and inertia
at the Bureau. 219 By competing with the CFPB in this way, the states
will serve as a check on the agency and help ensure that it is active in
enforcing its own regulations.
In sum, Dodd-Frank has pushed consumer financial protection
firmly in the direction of dynamic federalism, and this shift will help
resolve the preemption dilemma. This development represents a
significant change from the static regulatory structure of the past
decade where the 0 CC and the O TS prevented states from exercising
regulatory power, particularly in the area of predatory lending. The
states are now closer to being coequal regulators with the federal
government in the realm of consumer financial products and services.
By strengthening consumer financial protection authority at the state
and federal levels, the need for preemption-and any dilemma that
follows-should decline.
CONCLUSION
This Recent Development has presented a way to understand
Dodd-Frank as providing a new framework between state and federal
consumer protection authority. Dodd-Frank creates a structure of
"dynamic federalism" in consumer financial protection regulation: it
creates a new federal agency charged with protecting consumers and
adopting nationwide regulation, and it gives states more powers to
protect their own citizens than existed before the legislation. The new
relationship that Dodd-Frank creates between states and the federal
government can be seen most clearly in the ways that it helps resolve
the preemption dilemma. This dilemma arises because federal
preemption of state consumer financial laws does provide consumers
with economic benefits, but at the same time, preemption may also
hurt consumers. Both sides of the debate about federal preemption
that has occurred over the past decade have had an element of truth
in their arguments. However, because of Dodd-Frank's changes to
219. This point is not speculative. Other areas of regulation, in which state regulators
spurred the federal government into taking action, thus resulting in effective cooperation
between state and federal agencies, illustrate how a framework for dynamic federalism can
develop. This has happened, for instance, in the case of securities regulation. Eliot Spitzer,
then-attorney general of New York, investigated and exposed analyst conflicts, and the
SEC later joined him in his actions. This collaboration allowed state and federal
government to share resources and resulted in a global settlement of $1.4 billion with
major Wall Street firms. See Jones, supra note 12, at 118-19. For a detailed account
chronicling Spitzer's investigation of analyst conflicts, see generally John Cassidy, The
Investigaton: HowEliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54.
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preemption, the emergence of the CFPB, and the new powers that
Dodd-Frank provides the states, this debate is now likely to become
much less pronounced.
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